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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The present thesis is an outgrowth of my senior honors
thesis which I wrote as an undergraduate at the University
of Massachusetts back in 1983. Both papers deal with the
same subject, but there are a great many differences between
them. My senior honors thesis focused almost exclusively on
the views of David Hume. Some comparisons to the views of
Rene Descartes were made. In the present essay, equal
attention will be paid to the views of four of the greatest
western philosophers: Rene Descartes, David Hume, John
Locke and Immanuel Kant.
My experience has been that whenever any of the great
philosophers are studied in isolation one becomes very
susceptible to their views, since they argue so well. When
I first read David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature , I was
wholly convinced that we cannot be certain that our minds
are anything more than collections of perceptions. It is
only after one has acquired a knowledge of the works of a
few philosophers that one can begin to see some of the
faults in the reasonings of these great thinkers.
This paper represents my own attempt to gain a larger
perspective on a philosophical problem that had intrigued me
since I first read Descartes' Meditations . The problem is
to determine what sort of knowledge we have of ourselves as
thinking beings. Descartes was certain that he existed as a
l
2thinking being, and what is more, he thought he could be
certain that, as a thinking being, he was an immaterial
spirit wedded to a corporeal substance, his body.
John Locke rejected Descartes' conclusion that a person
can know himself to be an immaterial spirit. Locke thought
that we experience our own thinking, and so, we cannot doubt
that we think. But, he said, as far as we know, it may be
possible that the substance that thinks in us is replaced at
every moment by a new substance, but that our consciousness
remains unaffected since these substances can transfer the
same consciousness from one to another.
According to David Hume, we cannot even know that there
is an active mind that thinks within us. He thought that
all we can know of the mind is that it is a collection of
perceptions. Faulty reasoning led Hume to this conclusion.
In my section on Hume I attempt to show exactly what the
faults in his reasoning are.
Immanuel Kant also thought that Hume's conclusion con-
cerning our knowledge of our minds was wrong. According to
Kant, we can know there to be something within us that
thinks. Unlike Locke, however, Kant did not think that we
know that this thinking thing resides in us by experience.
Kant thought that we learn of the existence of the thinking
mind within us by drawing inferences from experience. By
considering what experience would be by itself, apart from
the activities of the thinking mind, and by considering how
3much we actually know about our experience, we can determine
how much our understanding contributes to our experience.
Once we have determined that the understanding must make a
contribution to our knowledge of our experience in order
that we can know as much about that experience as we do, we
must naturally conclude that, of course, this understanding,
or thinking part of the mind, must really exist.
In sum, then, we can be certain that we think, but we
cannot be certain as to what sort of thing it is that thinks
in each of us. The question remains open whether it is some
immaterial spirit, or if it is just a corporeal substance,
our brains. If we suppose it is an immaterial spirit, we
cannot be certain that it is always the same spirit that
thinks within us, for, as far as we know, immaterial spirits
may be capable of transferring consciousnesses from one to
another. If, on the other hand, we suppose that it is a
brain that thinks within us, then we can be relatively
certain that it is always the same brain that thinks within
us, barring, of course, the possibility of some
science-fiction-like experiment in which the same
consciousness can be transferred by radio waves, from one
brain to another.
Insofar as I succeed in putting the views of the four
philosophers mentioned above on the problem of what sort of
knowledge we have of ourselves as thinking beings, in
perspective, this paper will be helpful to beginning
4students interested in studying the works of these men. it
will help them to see some of the faults in the reasonings
of these great thinkers. It will also help them to form the
basis of an opinion of their own on this problem.
CHAPTER II
RENE DESCARTES
Rene Descartes had been dissatisfied with the
philosophy of his time ever since he was a young man. He
said that despite the fact that it had "been cultivated for
many centuries by the best minds that had ever lived... no
single thing is to be found in it which is not subject of
dispute ". 1 He noted that, in philosophy, learned men will
apply all of their skill and ingenuity to make the views
they support seem probable. The fact that a view seems
probable, then, may be no more a sign of its truth than of
the skill employed in presenting it. For such reasons,
Descartes said that he "esteemed as well-nigh false all that
2
only went as far as being probable".
He was greatly impressed with mathematics "because of
the certainty of its demonstrations and the evidence of its
3
reasoning". In geometry, for example, one begins with five
axioms, such as that any two points determine a line, and
deduce theorems in accordance with some rule of inference.
Descartes hoped to be able to apply a similar brand of
reasoning to philosophy.
The axioms of geometry, Descartes thought, are
4
self-evident. They do not require proof. One could say
that they are self-evident because no one can doubt that
they are true. To apply geometrical reasoning to
philosophy, Descartes would first have to discover some
5
6self evident principles to serve as his axioms. All the
rest of his principles he would derive from these first
principles. His complaint against philosophies of previous
generations was that nothing of any certainty could be found
in them. Any principle in which he could not be completely
certain could not serve as an axiom for Descartes. For him,
to be an axiom meant to be indubitable. Descartes wanted
his first principles of philosophy to have the same epistem-
ological status as the axioms of geometry. He wanted them
to be beyond doubt.
Descartes searched for his first principles by testing
each of his beliefs to see whether any of them could not be
doubted. In the Meditations he finds that he may even doubt
that he has a body. "I shall suppose", he said,
not that God who is supremely good and the
fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less
powerful than deceitful has employed his whole
energies in deceiving me. I shall consider that
the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound,
and all other external things are nought but the
illusions and dreams of which this genius has
availed himself in order to lay traps for my
credulity; I shall consider myself as having no
hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any
senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess
all these things.
Even under this assumption, however, he could not doubt his
own existence. Even if "there is some deceiver or other",
ghe said, "I exist also if he deceives me". Having found
that he could not doubt that he exists, Descartes decided
that the proposition, "I am", would serve as a type of axiom
7for his philosophical system.
Axioms serve as premises in the derivation of further
theorems. Given that he exists, the first thing that
Descartes was concerned to show was what he must be. in the
end, he concluded that he could only be a thinking
substance. He had a variety of things to say as to what a
substance is. At one place he distinguished between a
substance and a created substance. The only substance, God,
is, he said, "a thing which so exists that it needs no other
thing in order to exist". ^ Created substances, on the other
hand, "need only the concurrence of God in order to exist ". 8
A complete substance is, he said, "merely a substance
endowed with these forms or attributes which suffice to let
Q
me recognize that it is a substance". Incomplete
substances, he said, "have no lack of completeness", and are
only incomplete, "insofar as they are referred to some other
substance, in unison with which they form a single
self-subsistent thing".^ A hand, for example, may be
considered an incomplete substance since it is a substance
in itself, and also contributes, along with other parts, to
the composition of the body of a person.
Descartes also distinguished between corporeal and
spiritual substances. Substances are of either sort
depending upon what sort of principal attribute they have.
It is "a common notion", said Descartes, "that nothing is
possessed of no attributes, properties, or qualities'. It
8follows that if one observes an attribute, there must be
something to which the attribute belongs. Descartes went on
to say that "although any one attribute is sufficient to
give us a knowledge of substance, there is always one
principal property of substance which constitutes its nature
and essence, and on which all the others depend". 12 From
the observation of any one of its attributes, then, we can
know a thing to exist; but only by discovering the thing's
principal attribute can we come to know what it is.
The essence, or nature, of any substance depends upon
its principal attribute. A substance cannot be of a parti-
cular nature if it does not have the attribute that is
unique to substances of that nature. A substance cannot
remain the same sort of thing if its principal attribute is
taken away. All of its other attributes may be changed
without changing the nature of the substance. To discover
what a substance is essentially, then, one would need to
consider what attributes of the thing could not be changed
without changing what the thing itself is.
In the Meditations . Descartes considered what the
13
essence of a piece of wax might be. He began by noting
that the piece of wax that he had in his hand had a color, a
smell, and emitted a sound when struck. When he moved the
wax near a flame, none of these attributes remained. "Let
us attentively consider this, and", he said, "abstracting
from all that does not belong to the wax, let us see what
9remains
. He concluded that only the attributes of being
extended, flexible, and movable remained. These attributes,
he thought, are merely modifications of the attribute of
extension. The principal attribute of the wax, according to
Descartes, is extension.
The difference between corporeal and spiritual
substances is that they have different principal attributes.
Descartes said that "extension in length, breadth, and
depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and
thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance ". 16 As
he goes on to say, "we cannot conceive figure but as an
extended thing; so imagination, feeling, and will, only
exist in a thinking thing". 16
Because Descartes thought that there are two different
kinds of substances, the corporeal and the spiritual, he was
a dualist. "Two substances are said to be really distinct",
said Descartes, "when each of them can exist apart from the
other h. 1 ^ He thought that corporeal and spiritual
substances could subsist independently of one another, and
that is why he thought they were distinct.
Descartes thought that the mind is more easily known
than the body. He could doubt that the external world
exists, but he could not doubt his own existence. As he
said,
if I persuade myself that there is an earth
because I touch or see it, by that very same fact,
and yet by a stronger reason, I should be per-
10
suaded that my thought exists; because it may be
that I think I touch the earth even though thereis possibly no earth existing at all, but it is
not possible that I who form this judgment and my
mind which judges thus, should be non-existent
.
°
One might think that Descartes is an idealist since he
believes it is possible that the external world does not
exist. But he thought that, as a matter of fact, there are
two types of substances. He believed that these two types
existed independently of one another. One type of substance
could exist even if the other did not. There could be a
world with no spirits, or there could be a community of
spirits with no physical world for them to inhabit.
Because he believed that "nothing belongs £o my essence
U-tg-t , to the essence of the mind alone) beyond the fact
tlmt I am a thinking being " . he concluded that the mind
and body are completely independent of one another. He
denied that the fact that the mind is an incomplete
substance, insofar as it is only a part of the essence of
man, implies that the mind must be dependent upon the body.
"For in my opinion", he said,
nothing without which a thing can still exist is
comprised in its essence, and although mind
belongs to the essence of man, to be united to a
human body is in„^he proper sense no part of the
essence of mind.
According to Descartes, the way in which we know the
objects of sense is proof of the existence of the mind. As
he said, "all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge
of wax, or any other body whatever, are yet better proofs of
11
the nature of the mind !". 21 As we noted, he found that he
could doubt the existence of the external world. He could
not doubt that he had sensations, but he could doubt that
external objects were the cause of his sensations.
Descartes considered three possible causes of his sensa-
tions. He said,
although the ideas which I receive by the senses
do not depend on my will, I did not think that one
should for that reason conclude that they
proceeded from things different from myself, since
possibly some faculty might be discovered in
me— hithert0 unknown to me—which produced
them
.
One possible cause of his sensations, then, would be his own
self
.
Descartes ruled out this possibility. He supposed
that God could create whatever he, Descartes, could clearly
and distinctly conceive, exactly as he conceived it. Proof
that two things could exist separately, he thought, was the
fact that he could clearly and distinctly conceive one
without the other. This led Descartes to the conclusion
that he was only a thinking thing which, as such, could
exist separately from his body. As a thinking thing he had
certain faculties. His faculty of imagination, he thought,
could not be conceived as being distinct from a thinking
thing. The images he imagined would not exist if there were
not something doing the imagining. Likewise, the faculty by
which we observe objects changing position or shape would be
useless unless there were some objects going through change.
12
Hence, it cannot be, according to Descartes, that a person
can be the cause of his own sensations.
This argument begs the question. Why is it that the
objects that appear to be going through change cannot be
supplied by some unknown faculty of the mind? Descartes
said that this cannot be so because the active faculty that
does supply the objects of sense "does not presuppose
23thought". What causes objects to be present to our
passive faculty of perception is something that would exist
even if thinking things did not exist, according to
Descartes. But this is exactly what needs to be shown.
Descartes also argues that the fact that "ideas are
often produced in me without my contributing in any way to
the same, and often against my will", shows that these ideas
cannot be produced solely by his own faculties. But if we
can suppose there to be some unknown faculty of his that
causes his sensations we can also suppose that he has no
control over this faculty. Descartes' arguments against
this first explanation of how his sensations are caused are
ineffective. But he goes on to consider what must be the
cause of his sensations if the cause is not, as he supposes,
one of his own faculties.
According to Descartes, there are only two more
possible explanations. Either his sensations were caused by
God, and there really is no external world, or else they
were caused by external objects. He ruled out the former
13
possibility when he said, "since God is no deceiver, it is
very manifest that He does not communicate to me these ideas
immediately ". 25 External objects, then, must be the causes
of sensations.
What the cause of our sensations may be is, however,
unimportant as far as any proof of the existence of a
thinking thing is concerned. Whatever the cause of the
sensations, it is enough to show that the mind contributes
something to our knowledge of them in order to show that the
mind exists as an active, thinking thing. Whatever their
cause, the existence of sensations is a matter of fact. One
need only consider what sensations are by themselves, to
determine what contribution the mind makes to our knowledge
of them. From the fact that we can know more about what we
perceive than we could ever receive from our unthinking
senses, we can infer that there must be a thinking mind.
Descartes makes similar observations while discussing
the piece of wax in the Meditations . As we noted before,
Descartes' wax had a certain color, smell, and made a
9 fi
certain sound when struck. Also, as we noted, Descartes
concluded that only extension belongs to the wax
essentially. All other aspects of the wax may be changed.
Suppose the attributes are changed, as by the heat from
Descartes' fire. How does one know that what results is
still a piece of wax? Not by the senses, for every
sensation of the wax is different from before. An act of
14
judgment is required. One must know what sort of changes
wax is capable of, and be able to recognize when any such
changes take place. The senses merely convey information.
They cannot make judgments.
Consider the attributes that persist through change.
Extension, and its modes, flexibility and movability, are
not attributes of the wax that are apprehended through the
senses. A sensation is something that occurs instan-
taneously, and is replaced just as quickly by a new sensa-
tion. Through sensation we become acquainted with a
particular quality of the wax, at a particular time and
place. But by saying that the wax is flexible we make a
judgment as to how its appearance may change in the future.
Descartes believed that we have a conception of what
wax is. We cannot imagine all the possible combinations of
size, shape, and position that one piece of wax is capable
of assuming, yet we know that these combinations are
possible. Our conception of wax is what enables us to com-
prehend all these possibilities. Descartes did not explain
what this concept is, but we may suppose that it is a set of
principles that describe what conditions will cause what
changes in wax. Part of our conception of wax, then, would
be our knowledge that heat causes it to expand.
When a change in the wax occurs we judge that it is the
same wax by referring to our conception of wax. If it were
not for our ability to judge, and our ability to form
15
concepts, we could be unable to perceive that objects
persist through change. From the fact that we do perceive
persistence through change we can infer that we can judge
from concepts.
But, more than this, from the fact that we perceive
persistence through change, we can infer that there is an
active, judging mind that does the perceiving. To deny this
conclusion one must hold that a knowledge of attributes such
as flexibility—attributes that entail that the object in
question does persist through time—can be given through
sensation
.
. 97As we mentioned before, Descartes thought that he
knew his mind and body to be completely separate and
independent things just from the fact that he could conceive
of each without the other. The reason he could conceive
each separately was that each has a different principal al-
tribute from the other. The principal attribute of the mind
is thinking, while the principal attribute of the body is
2 8
extension. As we also mentioned, Descartes thought that
from the observation of a single attribute one can rightly
infer the existence of a substance to which that attribute
belongs. Just as from the observation of a colored figure
one can infer the presence of a physical object, such as a
piece of wax, so from an awareness that there is thinking
going on, one can infer that there is a spiritual substance
doing the thinking. As Descartes said,
16
it is certain that no thought can exist apart
a thing that thinks; no activity, no accident
be without a substance in which to exist. 9
from
can
CHAPTER III
JOHN LOCKE
John Locke asked us to suppose the mind to originally
be like a Dlank sheet of paper, or like an empty cabinet . 30
He thought that the mind comes to be full of ideas only
through experience. Sensation and reflection are the only
sources of our ideas, according to him. Ideas are derived
through sensation by the interaction of our senses with
external objects. Locke said that reflection is similar to
3
1
sensation, and may be called "internal sense". Ideas
derived through reflection have to do with the operations
and activities of the mind itself.
Locke said that an idea is "whatsoever is the Object of
32
the Understanding when a man thinks". Our first ideas are
3 3
sensations. They awaken the mind and cause it to begin to
think. The first idea we derive from reflection is that of
perception. 3 ^ Locke mentioned the fact that people often do
not hear what is going on around them, not because they are
deaf, but only because they are too busy thinking about
3 K .
other matters. He said that "whatever impressions are
made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of
within, there is no Perception".
3
^ One must pay attention
to one's sensations in order to perceive, and by realizing
that perceiving depends upon paying attention one can
recognize oneself as being a perceiving thing one can
recognize that one has some control over what one perceives.
17
18
Ideas are the raw material of thought. Thinking, to
Locke, is just a series of mental operations. He thought
that a man's repertoire of such operations is limited. As
he said,
Man's Power and its way of Operation
... [are ] much-
what the same in the Material and Intellectual
World. For the Materials in both being such as he
has no power over, either to make or destroy, all
that Man can do is either to unite them together,
or to set them by one another, or wholly separate
them. '
By uniting ideas, complex ideas are formed. When ideas are
set by one another, they can be compared, and through
comparison, relations between ideas can be discovered.
General ideas are formed by wholly separating, or
abstracting, one or more ideas from a complex idea of a
particular object. According to Locke, all of our ideas are
either simple ideas, or else they are either complex,
abstract, or expressive of relations.
Locke said that "We know by Experience, that we
O O
sometimes think". That we know we are thinking is,
according to him, as apparent to us as that the sun is
shining. Both are matters of experience. It is no harder
to understand how an idea of an operation of the mind is
derived through reflection, than to understand how the idea
of light is derived through sensation. As Locke said,
The Mind receiving the Ideas . . . from without, when
it turns its view upon itself, and observes its
own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from
19
thence other I_dga_s
,
which are as capable to be the
objects of its contemplation, as any of those it
received from foreign things. y
We use words, thought Locke, in order to express to
others the ideas in our own minds. As he said, "Words in
ei ilDfliy Signification f st and for nothing . but the
I-dgji
.
s in ths Mlad oJL him that u_s_es them "
.
40 He thought that
the truth of any proposition consists in the agreement of
the ideas signified by the terms in the proposition
.
41 For
example, the statement, "This white swan is black", is false
because the idea of a white swan does not agree with the
idea of a black swan. The agreement of ideas, which is the
basis of Locke's account of truth and falsity, is something
that a person determines for himself just by comparing the
ideas in his head.
Locke said that, "he that hath not determined the Ideas
to the Words he uses, cannot make Propositions of them, of
4 2
whose Truth he can be certain". It follows that if we
want to be certain of the truth of our propositions we must
first determine what ideas correspond to the words we use.
Locke said that "The far g reatest part of Words . that
make all Languages, are general Terms "
,
43 General terms are
the outward signs of general ideas. Locke said that
Ideas become general, by separating from them the
circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other
Ideas , that may deterin^ne them to this or that
particular Existence.
20
and he gives an example of how this is done. An infant in a
nursery may notice that his nurse and his mother have
similar shapes, and have other qualities in common; and by
abstracting the ideas of these shared qualities, he forms a
general idea, of which he has not yet a name, but which we
know to be the idea of a human being
.
45
Afterwards, he will
classify beings as human according to whether or not they
conform to the abstract idea of a human being that he has
formed.
Locke said that "gygxy distil)gt abstract idea , is a
distinct Essence "
.
46 He distinguished between real and
nominal essence. The real essence of things is "the real
internal, but in Substances, unknown Constitution of things,
whereon their discoverable Qualities depend ". 47 The nominal
essence of a thing, on the other hand, is some of its
discoverable qualities, which may agree with some abstract
idea that we have, and so allow us to give the thing a name.
Descartes thought that objects have principal attributes
4 8
which make them instances of their kind. These
attributes, he thought, are essential to the objects.
Descartes thought the real essences of things can be known.
Locke said,
Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and he will
find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of
Essential . the consideration of some Species . or
the complex Idea . signified by some general name,
comes into his Mind: And 'tis in reference to
that, that this or that Quality is said to be
21
We do not distinguish substances into species, said
Locke, according to their real essences, he thought that
things must have internal constitutions which are respons-
ible for the production of the various properties we observe
in the objects. But this constitution is unknown to us. If
we see two objects with similar properties, we infer that
their constitutions must be similar. Once we have
classified objects into species according to their
observable qualities, we can suppose there to be some
similarity in their internal constitutions, and this is as
close as we can come to aknowledge of the real essence of a
species. It is only by the nominal essence of things that
we can distinguish them into species. It is only
after-the-fact that we suppose the members of a species to
share a common, real essence.
Locke said that words stand for ideas only. His claim
that we distinguish substances into species by reference to
their nominal essence is compatible with this view. The
nominal essence of anything is just an abstract idea with a
name annexed to it. Abstract ideas are ideas of types of
things, but we also have ideas of particular things. Locke
thought that our ieas of particular things are just
collections of simple ideas, along with a vague notion of
something to which those simple ideas belong, or in which
they inhere. Whereas our ideas of types of things are
22
abstract ideas, our ideas of particular things are complex
ideas. Whereas our ideas of types of things are independent
of time and place, "and any other Ideas , that may determine
them to this or that particular Existence ", 50 our ideas of
particular things contain exactly those ideas which
determine them to a particular existence, such as the ideas
of time and place.
Our complex ideas of particular things are prior to our
abstract ieas of types of things. As we noted
,
51 Locke
thought that the mind can either unite, relate, or separate
its ideas. The ideas that make up our complex idea of some
particular thing must first be united before an idea of what
sort of thing it is can be abstracted. Locke said,
that our complex Ideas of Substances, besides all
these simple Ideas they are made up of, have
always the confused Idea of something to which
they belong, and in which they subsist. 1
This is because "we imagine", said Locke, that simple ideas,
"cannot subsist, sine re substante . without something to
support them". Our idea of substance m general, said
Locke, is of that which produces and supports simple ideas.
According to Locke, we form "an obscure and relative"
idea of substance in general before we form our ideas of the
54different types of substances. He said that even though
we categorize an object into a species according to its
nominal essence, we often suppose that each object, once
23
categorized into a particular species, shares a common,
unknown constitution with the other members of that species.
Descartes thought there to be two different substances
out of which particular existences are formed: the
corporeal and the spiritual
.
55 He thought that the two
kinds of substances existed independently of one another, so
that spiritual substances are immaterial. Locke said that
it is impossible
for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas .
without revelation, to discover, whether
Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of
Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and
think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so
disposed, a thinking immaterial substance, 6
or, as he said elsewhere, "it is no harder to conceive how
Thinking should exist without Matter, than how Matter should
57think". The only difference that Locke saw between
corporeal and spiritual substance is that the simple ideas
that make up our complex idea of a spiritual substance are
derived from reflection. The ideas of corporeal substances
are compposed of such simple ideas as extension, solidity,
and of such not-so-simple ideas as the idea we may have of
an object that it has the power to fly or to swim. Our
ideas of spiritual substances, on the other hand, are made
up exclusively of ideas of the operations of the mind.
Locke thought that our "obscure and relative" idea of
substance in general is the same whether we are considering
corporeal or spiritual substances. He used the phrase
24
"particular sorts of substances" to refer to different sorts
of objects, such as foxes, apples, or minds. Descartes'
claim that there are two sorts of substances may give rise
to some confusion when discussing Locke's view of spiritual
substance. For Locke, spirits, or minds, are just another
of the many sorts of substances. The same 'obscure and
relative' idea of substance in general underlies our ideas
of spiritual and corporeal substances. For Descartes,
substance in general was of two kinds, spiritual and
corporeal. Locke said that
Whatever... be the secret and abstract Nature of
SJJLbsiance in general, all the Ideas &£ have of
particular distinct sorts oi Substances , are
nothing but several Combinations of simple I deas .
coexisting in such, though unknown, Cause of^their
Union, as makes the whole subsist of itself.
What Locke said here applies equally to spiritual as well as
corporeal substances. Descartes thought that the mind was
59
more easily known than the body. Locke thought that the
real essence of objects of either sort are equally unknown.
The abstract idea we form of spirit is what gives us
the opinion that spiritual substances are independent of
matter, according to Locke. He said that
the Mind getting, only by reflecting on its own
Operations, those simple Ideas which it attributes
to Sp ir its , it hath, or can have no other Notion
of Spirit but by attributing all those Operations,
it finds in itself, to a 6 §ort of Being, withoutConsideration of Matter
.
The fact that our abstract idea of spirit contains no ideas
that are also to be found in any of our ideas of the
25
different sorts of corporeal substances, does not prove to
Locke that spiritual and corporeal substances are made up of
fundamentally different stuff. He thought that it is only
according to the nominal essence of things that we
distinguish them into species; and a nominal essence, he
thought, is just an abstract idea with a name. For all we
know, the real essence of spirit, its internal and unknown
constitution, may be formed out of the exact same stuff as
are the real essences of various material things. Locke
said that,
We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes
think, and thence draw this infallible
Consequence, That there is something in us, that
has a Power to think. 1
Descartes thought that we can know the thing that has a
power to think to be an immaterial substance. We can know
it to be a substance, he thought, because thinking is an
attribute, and no attributes can exist without a substance
6 2in which to inhere. We can know it to be immaterial, he
thought, because only thinking belongs to it essentially. 63
Locke thought that "thinking is the Action , and not the
6 4Essence of the soul", because the soul does not always
think, as when it is asleep. He said that
the Operations of Agents will easily admit of
intention and remission; but the Essences of
things, are not conceived capable of any such
variation . 6
^
If thinking were the essence of the mind, and the mind were
to fall asleep, and stop thinking, then it would stop being
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a mind.
Locke thought that even though we are justified in
supposing that there is something within us that has a power
to think
,
we do not know the secret nature, or real essence
of this thing. Hence, we do not know that it is an
immaterial substance, any more than we know that it is a
material one. How little we know about the thinking
substance itself is shown, by Locke, when he comes to
discuss personal identity.
According to Locke, a man's personal identity is
determined by his consciousness. He said that "without
consciousness, there is no Person ". 66 A person's
consciousness need not be continuous. Indeed, it is not,
since he must sleep. Any two ideas that belong to the same
consciousness, belong to the same person. We may suppose
that, for ideas to belong to the same consciousness, they
need not be present to that consciousness at the same time,
but only that they must both be capable of being recalled at
will
.
Locke considered the question,
whether if the same Substance, which thinks, be
changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining
the same, it can be different Persons.
He noted that the first part of this question is of interest
only to those who suppose the substance that thinks to be
immaterial. Those who think that what thinks in us is some
material object, such as the brain, would naturally say that
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the same person remains through a change of substance, since
they would acknowledge that the body constantly replaces the
substance out of which it is made. Likewise, the second
part of the question concerns only those who take the
substance that thinks to be immaterial, since those who
consider it to be a material substance that thinks within us
believe that this substance does not remain the same.
Locke answered affirmatively to both parts of the
question. As to the first part, he said,
if the same consciousness.
. . can be transferr'd
from one thinking substance to another, it will be
possible, that two thinking Substances may make
but one Person. For the same consciousness being
preserv'd, whether in the same or different
Substances, the personal identity is preserv'd
.
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According to Locke, we do not know that the same
consciousness ever is transferred between thinking
substances; but we do not know that such transference cannot
be made either. For all we know, the substance that thinkks
in us may be constantly replaced by a new substance each
minute, and yet our consciousness remains unaffected.
Locke's view that personal identity consists in
sameness, or continuity of consciousness supports his claim
that we cannot know the thing that thinks within us to be an
immaterial substance. He said that "We can have Knowledge
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no farther than we have I deas " . We know there to be some
active faculty within us that performs the mental operations
that we perceive, but we have only a relative idea of the
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substance to which that faculty belongs. if, as Locke said
it is possible that the substance that thinks within us can
be changed without any change in our consciousness, then,
for all we know, the thing that thinks within us may be
different at any given moment.
CHAPTER IV
DAVID HUME
David Hume considered experience to be our only source
of knowledge, as did Locke. He thought that experience is
made up of perceptions. As he said, "no beings are ever
present to the mind but perceptions ". 70 He felt that all
our perceptions could be classified as either impressions or
ideas. All of our simple ideas, said Hume, are derived
from, and exactly represent, some impression. 7 "'' Because
this is so, it is impossible for us to have an idea of
something of which we have not first had the impression. 7 ^
Because our experience consists of nothing but perceptions,
Hume said that " ' tis impossible for us so much as to
conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different
from ideas and impressions". After we have had a certain
impression, and derived a simple idea from it, our
imagination can take that idea and connect it to any of our
other ideas, and form whatever sort of combinations it
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wishes. But, said Hume,
Let us chace our imagination to the heavens, or to
the utmost limits of the universe; we never really
advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive
any kind of existence, but those perceptions,
which have appear'd in that narrow commpass. This
is the universe of the imagination, ^gr have we
any idea but what is there produc'd.
Also, following Locke, Hume held that all our
impressions derive from either sensation or reflection.
Stated in Hume's terms, we have two sorts of impressions,
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and they are our only sources of ideas. The impressions of
sensation "are such as without any antecedent perception
arise in the soul ". 76 The impressions of reflection, on the
other hand, arise either immediately after an impression of
sensation, or after some idea. Said Hume,
Of the first kind are all the impressions of the
senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of
the second are all the passions and other emotions
resembling them.
Hume's theory of knowledge is similar to one that Plato
discussed in the TJagastetus . Hume held that whatever
knowledge we have is based upon experience. Perceptions
are, so to speak, the basic units of experience. Hume said
that "The only existences, of which we are certain, are per-
1 8
ceptions". One can imagine Hume saying, as Theaetetus is
portrayed as having said that
It seems to me that one who knows something is
perceiving the thing he knows, and, so far as I
can see at present, knowledge is nothing but
perception.
The view that knowing is the same as perceiving leads
naturally to a conclusion that was very important to Hume.
If to know is to perceive, then not to perceive is not to
know. If we do not have a perception of a thing, then we do
not have knowledge of it either. To know that a thing
exists is to have some knowledge of it. Hence, we cannot
know that there are things that we do not perceive, if to
know is to perceive. We can determine the scope and limits
of our knowledge, then, just by determining what perceptions
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we have.
Locke considered words to be the outward signs of the
ideas in a person's mind
.
80 Hume's view is similar, as he
considered the meaning of any term to be the idea or ideas
that it conveys, or brings to mind. Locke thought that if
we are not clear as to what ideas our terms signify we will
have no way of knowing whether the statements we use those
terms in are true or false. °‘L Similarly, Hume thought that
if we use a term to which there is no corresponding idea,
then because we do not know the thing the term refers to,
that sort of term is meaningless to us. As Hume said,
When we entertain... any suspicion that a
philosophical term is employed without any meaning
or idea... we need but enquire, from what
iippxgssipn is that supposed idea derived ? And if
it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to
confirm our suspicion.
Analyzing terms by searching out the perceptions that
correspond to them is fundamental to Hume's philosophy, and
he performs this sort of analysis often. Of special
interest to us is his analysis of our idea of mind. The
mind was considered, by people like Descartes, to be a
spiritual substance. We will begin by looking at Hume's
analysis of substance in general.
After having argued that our idea of substance is not
derived from the impressions of sensation or reflection,
Hume concluded that,
We have... no idea of substance, distinct from
that of a collection of particular qualities, nor
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have we any other meaning when we either talk or
reason concerning it. J
Locke thought that our ideas of particular substances are
made up, not just of simple ideas of the qualities of
objects, but they also contain an idea of something to which
they belong, or in which they inhere . 84 Hume acknowledged
the fact that the particular qualities, which form a
substance, "are commonly refer 'd to an unknown something . in
which they are supposed to inhere ", 85 but he considered this
something to be a fiction. The something in which we
suppose that perceived qualities inhere is entirely
different from any of our perceptions. Hume said that
We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a
perception. A substance is entirely different
from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of
a substance. b
To this it should be added that, we have no idea of a
substance as something that is different from perceptions.
Our only ideas of substances are, as Hume said, just
collections of perceptions.
The above conclusion applies equally to spiritual and
corporeal substances. As we noted, Hume held that the "only
existences of which we are certain, are perceptions", but he
thought that the constancy and coherence of some of our
perceptions enables us to suppose that there are existences
independent of us, which are distinct from our momentary and
87interrupted perceptions. Despite the fact that we are
naturally led to believe in external objects, Hume thought
33
that we cannot know that they exist. As far as we know,
what we take to be physical objects are really only
collections of perceptions, and the perceptions are all in
our minds.
Hume also thought that so-called spiritual substances,
or minds, are nothing but collections of perceptions. We
should note that he took the terms "self" and "mind" to be
equivalent. He said that "The idea of ourselves is always
O O
intimately present to us". According to his view of the
meaning of terms, this idea that we have of ourselves is the
meaning of the term "self" (or "mind"). Hume performed his
analysis of this term by seeking out the impressions from
which our idea of ourselves is derived. He said that
when I enter most intimately into what I call
myself , I always stumble on some particular
perception or other... I never can catch myself at
any time without a perception, and neygr can
observe any thing but the perception.
Because he could not find anything in his idea of himself
except particular perceptions, Hume concluded that his self
is nothing but a collection of perceptions, and his idea of
his self is nothing but an idea of one particular
collection. He generalized his findings, and said
I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind,
that they are nothing but a bundle or collection
of different perceptions, which succeed each other
with an inconceivable rapidi^, and are in a
perpetual flux and movement.
According to Hume, we have no idea of "the thing that
thinks" ("res cogitans" in Descartes' terms) within us. To
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him, the mind, although it may really be "a thinking thing",
is only known by us to be a collection of perceptions. He
said that,
The mind is a kind of theatre, where several
perceptions successively make their appearance...
The Comparison of the theatre must not mislead us.They are the successive perceptions only, that
constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant
notion of the place, where these scenes are
represented.
. .
1
Hume's analysis of "mind" seems inconsistent at first.
If the mind is, as Hume claims, just a bundle of percep-
tions, what is the "I" that enters into the self, and
stumbles over the various perceptions? Hume's way of
speaking suggests that there is something that looks around
at all the perceptions, and concludes that the mind is just
a collection of them. If there is something that enters
into the self, and reviews the self's various perceptions,
then, of course, it would be a mistake for that thing to
conclude that the mind is just a bundle of perceptions.
Suppose that Hume is right, that the mind is just a
collection of perceptions, and that minds have absolutely no
idea of anything within them that has a power to think. The
question is, how could a collection of perceptions, by
itself, have an awareness that it is just a collection of
92perceptions?
Nelson Pike gave an answer to this question. After
noting that only thinking things can be aware pi anything,
Pike said that "A series of conscious states cannot be
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of itself as a series",^ and the reason is because it is
not a thinking thing. He went on to say,
a series of conscious states might contain an
awareness which is itself represented as a
series. Analogy: A collection of pictures cannot
a picture which is of itself pictured as a
collection. But a collection of pictures might
contain a picture which is of itself pictured as a
collection
.
3
Pike's suggestion resolves the apparent inconsistency
in Hume's analysis of "mind". Hume's view that the mind is
just a bundle of perceptions is consistent at least, but is
it correct? If Hume is right, then we have no knowledge of
the existence of something within us that thinks.
Pike notes another apparent inconsistency in Hume's
manner of speaking. Pike said,
When we turn to Hume texts, we often find him
saying that the mind perceives, believes,
remembers, etc., things... [But] for Hume, the
mind does not do anything— it includes things.
Statements containing mental verbs... are used by
Hume as conveniences—manners of speech... [By
Humean analysis] statements mentioning the
activities of mind... [can be] replaced by
statements affirming only the presence of certain
mental substances (perceptions) within a certain
collection . 3
For example, the statement, "I see a table", can be analyzed
into the statement, "The visual perception of a table is
96
occurring within a certain collection of perceptions."
Hume said that,
All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a
comparison , and a discovery of those relations,
either constant or inconstant, which two or more
objects bear to each other.
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Comparing is an activity. If Pike is right about Hume, then
any statements mentioning the occurrence of comparisons
ought to be reducible to statements affirming the presence
of certain perceptions within a particular bundle of percep-
tions
.
How are we to reduce the statement, "I have compared
these objects", to a statement about perceptions? Unlike
our previous example of the statement, "I see a table", this
new statement is not so easily reducible because, although
we know that visual perceptions correspond to the activity
of seeing, we do not know what sort of perceptions
correspond to the activity of comparing.
Through comparison we discover how objects are similar
and how they are different. Perhaps we can reduce the
statement, "I have compared these objects" only by means of
a statement about what we have discovered by comparing, such
as "I have found them to be different". Using Pike's
analogy, we can say that we have pictures of these objects
hanging in our galleries, and "finding objects to be
different" only means that there is another picture in the
gallery that is a picture of the first two pictures, and
underneath this third picture there is a caption that reads,
"These objects are different". I can think of no other way
in which the information derived from comparing can be
portrayed in terms of conscious states, or in terms of
pictures in a gallery.
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In order for any collection of perceptions to contain
an awareness of differences among objects, then, there must
be something within the mind that can read the captions.
This can only be a thinking mind. The statement, "I have
found these objects to be different", is not reducible to
talk about perceptions; and so, neither is the activity of
comparing. Comparing entails the presence of a thinking
thing. It is impossible to represent the information
derived through comparison in terms of sensory information,
which is all that any perception, no matter how complex, can
contain
.
Hume cannot consistently hold that the mind is just a
collection of perceptions, and that the mind can compare.
One or the other of these views must go. To say that the
mind does not compare leads to absurdity. Hume, himself,
said
that time cannot make its appearance to the mind,
either alone, or attended with a steady unchange-
able object, but is always discover'd by some_„
perceivable succession of changeable objects.
We discover time, then, by noticing differences in objects
from one moment to the next. But we can only notice
differences by comparing. If we did not compare, we would
not notice differences, and so, we would have no awareness
of time. The fact that we are aware of time, then, shows
that we are capable of comparing.
Since we certainly do know that we compare, the only
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alternative is to admit that the mind is not just a
collection of perceptions. There is something within us
that can compare and think. This is the only sensible
conclusion
.
Some people think that Hume reached this conclusion on
his own. R. P. Wolff said that
Hume began the Treatise with the assumption that
empirical knowledge could be explained by
reference to the contents of the mind alone, and
then made the profound discovery that it was the
activity of the mind, rather than the nature of
its contents, which accounts for
q
all the puzzling
features of empirical knowledge. y
There are reasons for saying that this view of Hume is not
entirely accurate. The view that the mind is something that
can be active is contradictory to Hume's view, stated in the
Treatise , that the mind is just a collection of perceptions.
It seems unlikely that Hume would have made the profound
discovery that the mind is more than just a collection of
perceptions, and not have bothered to rewrite his first
philosophical work before it was published.
He did, in fact, rewrite the Treatise some years later.
The result of this rewrite was the Enquiries . In the
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding he omitted his
analysis of "mind", not because he thought the analysis was
wrong, but only because he wanted his new works to receive a
better reception than had the Treatise . In the Engu iri-g-S he
continues to hold the same view as to how to analyze
terms.
100
If he had elected to analyze the term "mind" in
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the En ctiiiries it is beyond doubt that he would have reached
the same conclusions he had in the Treatise . His method of
analysis had not changed from one book to the next.
CHAPTER V
IMMANUEL KANT
As we noted
,
John Locke and David Huine distinguished be-
tween ideas derived from sensation and ideas derived from
reflection. Immanuel Kant made a similar distinction. He
said that the mind has two faculties, sensibility and the
UlKte-E-g-LSAding . Knowledge, Kant held, arises only from the
interaction of these two parts of the mind. 101
According to Kant, our sensibility requires of the
objects of experience that they be spatiotemporally
continuous. He believed that our perception of space and
time arises out of us a priori . and is not derived from
experience. If the external objects that exist
independently of us were not spatiotemporally continuous,
then because we only perceive objects as being in space and
time, we would not be able to represent these objects to
ourselves, and so, we would not know them. The objects that
do appear to us through our senses appear to be in space in
time. Hence, we can conclude that the objects themselves
are spatiotemporally continuous.
The above argument is similar to the following. A
piece of hot wax is of such a nature that only hard objects
will make an impression upon it. If one sees the impression
of a seal upon some wax one can infer that the seal itself
is hard even without seeing it. The hardness of the seal in
this argument is analogous to the spatiotemporal continuity
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of objects in the other argument. Just as there would be no
impression on the wax if the seal were not hard, so there
could be no image of an object in the mind unless that
object were actually spatiotemporally continuous. For Kant,
the mind is of such a nature that only spatiotemporally
continuous objects can make an impression upon it.
Kant said that "appearances can certainly be given in
intuition independently of functions of the understand-
102ing". We can perceive things without thinking about
them. Locke also took note of this point. He observed that
a person who has no defect in hearing might not hear what is
going on around him if he is too busy thinking about other
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matters. I may have a succession of perceptions, but if
I do not attend to them, and investigate them in order to
discover their contents I do not learn anything from any of
them. Each single perception that I have appears and dis-
appears. If I did not investigate any of them, I can have
no memory of them after they are gone. As Kant said,
If each representation were completely foreign to
every other, standing apart in isolation, no such
thing as knowledge would ever arise. For
knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which
representations stand compared and connected.
It is the role of the understanding to compare and
connect our experiences. The understanding, Kant held, has
certain concepts which enable it to engage in rule-directed
activities. 105 The concepts provide rules which the
understanding must follow. As Kant said, "a concept is
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always, as regards its form, something universal which
serves as a rule". 1(^ Since it is the understanding that
connects up and organizes our experience, this organization
must be done according to rules.
Kant wanted to show that without the concepts of the
understanding it would be impossible for us to know that we
have any experience whatsoever. If we were presented with
different perceptions, and our minds did not apply their
concepts to the perceptions, then
These perceptions would not then belong to any
experience, consequently would then be without an
object, merely a blind play of representations,
less even than a dream . 1 '
Suppose I have a succession of perceptions. If so,
then at any given moment I have before me only one per-
ception. That perception may contain a variety of things.
If I am in a greenhouse during the spring then each of my
perceptions will contain many different patches of vivid
color. In order for me to learn anything from, or to get
anything out of, any one of my perceptions I must be able to
display each of the various contents of that perception
before my mind's eye. I must be able to say of my
perception, "There is a yellow patch, and a blue one,
several red ones, etc.". If I were not able to do this,
then no one of my perceptions would have any meaning to me
at all.
If, as I was displaying the contents of one of my
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perceptions before my mind, I forgot what the previous
content was as soon as I moved on to consider another
content, then the whole business of displaying those
contents would be of no use to me. I must be able to
remember what I find to be in my perceptions. If I could
not, then it would be just as if I never examined them in
the first place. The fact that I do know the contents of my
perceptions tells me that I must have run through them, and
that I must have remembered what I found to be their
contents
.
Kant makes the following point,
If we were not conscious that what we think is the
same as what we thought a moment before, all
reproduction in the
fi
series of representations
would be useless.
To see this, suppose I have a succession of perceptions, and
that at one point I reproduce in my imagination one of the
perceptions that has just gone by. If I were not aware that
what I have reproduced is the same as what has gone before,
then it would seem to me that what has been reproduced is
really only a part of my present perception. I could not
know it to have any relation to something that existed in
the past. It would not appear to me to be a reproduction,
or a memory. As I would not be aware that it is a memory, I
would not be aware of what it was remembered for. This
being so, I could not think to ns£ that memory, and so I
would not use it. I would be unable to compare the present
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to the past. I would be unaware of time.
I may be remembering some perception for the purpose of
displaying the contents of that perception before my mind.
But if I forget why I remembered that perception the image
will mean nothing to me. But if I know why I remembered the
perception and display its contents before my mind, and then
forget what these contents are (forget which perception they
belong to, or simply forget that they belong to some
perception forget, that is, that what they are are contents
of a perception)
,
then as these contents are displayed
before my mind, they will mean nothing to me.
If we could not know that we have certain mental images
just because we are remembering the contents of some past
perception, then we could never come to know what the
contents of any past perception were. And since we can only
display the contents of a perception to ourselves only after
the perception has occurred, it follows that we could never
learn the contents of any perception.
The fact is, however, that I am able to remember
things, and to know with certainty that what I have
presently remembered refers to something that actually
occurred to me in the past.
Because I can remember, my experience is more than just
a succession of disconnected perceptions. I can remember an
entire series of perceptions. I can remember them in the
exact order in which they occurred, or I can switch the
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order around. The order in which I remember my perceptions
depends upon the purpose I have in remembering them. if i
want to know how I got to a certain place I may remember my
perceptions in a regressive order so that I can retrace my
footsteps. Also, I can be aware of the contents of each
of my perceptions. All of this would be impossible if the
mind could only perceive, and not analyze its perceptions.
David Hume did not think that perceptions have to be
analyzed before their contents can be known. He spoke often
about perceptions of tables, trees, billiard balls, and
other common objects. He did not think about all the
knowledge, stored away in a person's mind, that must come
into play before that person can say of some visual image,
"That is the image of a table". Hume thought that the sole
activity of the mind is to associate ideas. Still, he did
not think that we could know for certain that there is a
mind that associates ideas. He thought that from the fact
that our ideas appear to be associated, we infer that there
must be some mind that associates them. As he said,
the actions of the mind are... the same with those
of matter. We perceive only their constant
conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it.
A major psychological principle of Hume's was that similar
ideas come to be associated by the mind, so that the
occurrence of one occasions the occurrence of the other.
This sort of association presupposes that the mind can
compare ideas and find them to be similar. Comparing,
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investigating, and, in general, discovering what the
contents of our perceptions are involves more than barely
perceiving. We know that the mind does more than just
perceive from the fact that we know more about our
perceptions than we could if all we did was perceive. if we
know the mind associates ideas, we know that the mind does
more than just perceive, and associate what it perceives,
since in order to associate ideas the mind must be able to
perform such operations as comparisons.
Kant distinguished between empirical apperception . or
irm£X s£H££, and £jLang£gn<3enta l apperception . 111 Empirical
apperception gives us a view of the contents of our minds.
When Hume entered most intimately into what he called his
self, and stumbled over his various perceptions, he was
engaged in empirical apperception. Locke said that we could
use the term "internal sense" to describe the notice that
the mind takes of its own operations. Through empirical
apperception, or inner sense, we come to know the empirical
self. As Kant said, inner sense "represents to
consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to
ourselves, not as we are in ourselves". Hume's phrase,
"a bundle of perceptions", can be used accurately to
describe the empirical self.
"Apperception" can mean "self-consciousness", but it
can also mean, "understanding experiences in terms of past
experience". It is the understanding that makes
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apperception of this second sort possible. The
understanding requires of all our perceptions that they fit
into one organized, unitary experience. This is required a
priori . Kant said
I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is
occupied not so much with objects as with the mode
of our knowledge insofar as, this mode of knowledge
is to be possible a priori .
Hence, transcendental apperception, or the a prior
i
requirement of an organized experience, is the ground, or
condition of the possibility of, empirical apperception.
The understanding goes about organizing its experiences
in accordance with certain categories, or concepts, that it
has. Proof that the understanding operates in this way is
that empirical apperception, or our experience taken as a
whole is organized upon certain principles.
That there is a part of the mind called the
understanding is obvious from the mere fact that we are
aware of our experiences at all. As Kant noted, without
this part of the mind, experience would be, "merely a blind
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play of representations, less even than a dream". It is
the understanding that investigates our perceptions so that
their contents can become known to us. It is the
understanding to which belong the faculties of memory and
imagination. In answer to Hume, how do we know that the
mind is not just a collection of perceptions? Because
without an active thinking part of the mind to understand
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our perceptions experience, or bare consciousness, would be
impossible
.
Kant's philosophy reaffirms that we can be certain that
there is a thinking aspect of the mind. Kant made Hume's
analysis of mind obsolete. Descartes thought we can be
certain that we exist as things that think, but he also
thought that we could know the thing that thinks within us
to be an immaterial spirit. John Locke thought that we
could know ourselves to be thinking things, but that we can
not know ourselves to be substances of any sort. Kant
agreed with Locke on this point.
I have already discussed Kant's point that experience
would be impossible without a thinking mind to interpret our
perceptions. Now, I would like to discuss his point that
self-knowledge would be impossible if the self did not have
any experiences. Kant said that "'I think'... is an
empirical proposition... [that] cannot take place without
inner sense". According to Kant, Descartes' belief that
we can know ourselves to be immaterial spirits rests on
faulty reasoning. Kant said that
I think myself on behalf of a possible experience,
at the same time abstracting from all actual
experience; and I conclude therefrom that I can be
conscious of my existence even apart from
experience and its empirical conditions. In so
doing I am confusing the possible abstrac.tl-QJl from
my empirically determined existence with the
supposed consciousness of a possible gepaxa_Le
existence of my thinking self, and I thus come to
believe that I have knowl_edgg that what is su£- g
stantial in me is the transcendental subject.
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In fact, the transcendental subject, or the understanding
considered by itself apart from any possible experience,
would be unconscious of everything, including itself.
Kant's insight into this matter is shown when we consider
that even those who believe the self to be an immaterial
spirit, and who believe in an after-life in which the self
is separated from this physical world, still can only
imagine that after-life in terms of a possible experience.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
I hope that this survey of the views of these four
philosophers on the same philosophical problem puts such a
perspective on this problem that renders it more
understandable. Before I end this paper I would like to
discuss Locke's view that we cannot be certain that it is
always the same substance that thinks within us.
As far as Locke was concerned, continuity of
consciousness was the sole criterion of personal identity.
He considered whether the same person could remain even if
the substance that thinks inside him were replaced. This
reduces to the question, can the same consciousness be
transferred from one thinking substance to another? Locke
considered this question within the context of taking the
substance that thinks to be immaterial. In this context,
the question is unanswerable since we do not know anything
about the nature of immaterial spirits. But the same
problem can be raised even if we suppose that it is some
material thing, such as a brain, that thinks within us. If
it is possible to transfer the same consciousness from one
brain to another, then, according to Locke, the same person
remains after the transfer as before.
Suppose a mad scientist devised a machine that could
transfer consciousness from one brain to another. If
everyone knew about this machine, they would know that it is
50
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possible that it will not always be the same substance that
thinks within them, and so they will not count sameness of
substance as the criterion of personal identity.
A person whose consciousness was transferred to another
brain by this machine would know that his consciousness has
been transferred since he would find himself inhabiting
another body. This fact distinguishes the case of transfer
of consciousness between brains from transfer of
consciousness between spirits. For, as Locke pointed out,
if it is a spirit that thinks within each of us, then these
spirits could transfer consciousness from one to the other
without our even knowing it, since they could also transfer
from body to body.
Suppose that the consciousness-transfer exists, and
that the mad scientist transfers consciousness from one
brain to another, but that he also sedates his victims and
performs a brain transfer on them. When the unsuspecting
victims awaken, they will find themselves within the same
bodies, and with the same consciousness as they had before
intact, but the substance that thinks within them will have
been changed. And they will no£ £Y£n Jsnnw i£. This case is
identical to the transfer of consciousness between spirits
that Locke considered.
If, on the other hand, a brain transfer were performed
without a consciousness transfer also taking place, the
victims would know that something fishy had happened to
52
them
,
but, furthermore, it would still be the same brain
that had the same consciousness within each of them.
If a person knew that consciousness transfers and brain
transfers were both possible, and he woke up in somebody
else 1 s body, he could not be certain whether he had
undergone a brain transfer or a consciousness transfer, and
so, he could not be certain whether it was still the same
substance that thinks within him.
We do not know that brain transfers and consciousness
transfers are impossible. We do know, however, that no one
has yet devised a way to perform either feat. Hence, those
of us who believe that it is a brain that thinks within each
of us can be satisfied that it is always the same substance
that thinks within each of us. Since our brains are part of
our bodies there is no need for us to refrain from taking
sameness of body to be a criterion of personal identity. Of
course, we cannot be absolutely certain that it is always
the same substance that thinks in us, since it is possible
that what thinks in us is an immaterial spirit. We must be
satisfied in being practically certain that it is always the
same substance that thinks within us.
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